The paper addresses two problems in the analysis of regional convergence in the European.
Introduction
In the current process of Eastern enlargement ten new member states are likely to join the European Union by 2004. As these countries have a lower per capita income on average than the current EU 15 member states, the regional income inequalities in the European Union will further increase. It is very likely that there will be demands to expand the European regional policy. It seems to be an iron law in the European Union that further economic integration in the form of enlargement or deepening should go hand in hand with an extension of the regional or cohesion policy. The establishment of the European Regional Development Fund In 1987, the Single European Act added article 158 (ex130) on Economic and Social Cohesion to the EC treaty. The more integrated Europe becomes, the more regional policies are put into practice. For the period of 2000-2006 the EU allocated 220.9 billion € to its regional policy which amounts to about one third of the total EU budget.
Still, there exist wide regional inequalities in the European Union. In 1999, per capita output (in purchasing power standards) of the 10 richest regions at the so-called NUTS1 level was at least 29% above the EU average (42% at NUTS2 level), while per capita output in the 10 poorest regions was at least 32 percent below the EU average (43% at NUTS2 level). 1 The degree of regional inequality has been relatively stable over the years. The variation of real GDP per capita (in purchasing power standards) in the EU, as measured by the coefficient of variation, was 0.30 in 1980, 0.26 in 1990 and 0.29 in 1999 . The EU regional income distribution is also rather unequal by international standards. In 1999, the variation of incomes (measured as GDP per capita in purchasing power standards for the EU, US data are GDP per capita in current dollar) as measured by the coefficient of variation of the 78 EU-NUTS1 regions was 0.30, while the same measure for 50 US-states was roughly half this size, 0.16. 
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The large regional inequalities and the tendency of ever-growing regional policies raise a number of questions. Does economic integration imply economic growth and convergence or not? How successful is the EU regional policy in diminishing regional inequalities? Is regional policy part of the solution or part of the problem of regional inequalities? Taken together should the regional transfers be increased, continued or even discontinued?
The theoretical discussion on convergence can be broadly distinguished between exogenous and endogenous growth models (see Boldrin and Canova, 2001, and de la Fuente, 2000 , for an overview). Neoclassical growth models imply conditional convergence, i.e. poor regions grow faster than high-income regions if region specific growth factors such as the skill level of the workforce or sociopolitical factors are controlled for. In contrast, endogenous growth models typically predict diverging regional incomes in the growth process.
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There are a number of empirical studies of convergence in the European context. A typical example is Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) . They estimate convergence regressions for some
European regions for the time prior to 1990 and find evidence for convergence similar to other regions. The estimate for the convergence parameter is around 2%, which implies that it takes around 35 years for a region to reduce its income gap with the national average by one half. Barro and Sala-i-Martin do not take into account EU regional policy and mix regions on different levels of aggregation in their sample. 3 Other studies that estimate convergence equations for some European regions are, among others, Neven and Gouyette (1995) , Sala -i- Martin (1997) , Faderberg and Verspagen (1996) , Paci and Pigliaru (2001), and Botazzi and Peri (2002) .
These studies provide only limited evidence for the issue of convergence in the specific context of the European Union and the role of the EU regional policy as they are characterized by at least one of the two following problems:
• The estimation period is prior to the expansion of the regional policy at the end of the 1980s.
• The data cover only parts of the European Union and come from different levels of regional aggregation.
To analyze the role of the EU regional policy it seems necessary to focus on the time after the expansion of this policy field, i.e. the 1990s. Before that time the regional policy played only a very limited role in the EU policy context.
To get a consistent estimate of the real convergence effects in the EU it is essential to include all EU regions in the estimation. Typically, empirical studies on convergence exclude some regions because of data problems. This lack of data is likely to be systematically linked to the income level of the regions, with poor regions providing fewer data than richer regions. With these incomplete data the choice of a specific variable in the estimation process also implies the selection of specific regions. Through this selection bias the studies are likely to produce inconsistent estimates (for a similar discussion in the context of industrialized countries see DeLong, 1988) . In addition as low income regions are more likely to be missing in the sample, the variance of the data is smaller and thus the precision of the estimates potentially
lower.
In what follows we will shed new light on the process of regional growth in the European Union. First, we estimate regional convergence regressions for the whole European Union. In order to avoid the selection bias special emphasis is placed on the use of data that is available for all EU regions. Secondly, the estimation takes the EU regional policy explicitly into account. The empirical evidence points to conditional convergence, with a relatively fast pace of convergence compared to other studies. The estimations show that regional differences in R&D account for some income variation between EU regions. The empirical evidence also indicates that EU regional policy does not affect relative growth performance of the EU regions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The following section discusses the theoretical framework. Section 3 elaborates on data issues and section 4 presents empirical results. Section 5 concludes with several implications for regional policy.
Regions as small open economies
Regional convergence in the European Union is analyzed in an exogenous growth model of a small open economy (see Herz and Röger, 1995) . 4 Exogenous growth models take the rate of technical progress as given and are well suited to explain differences in regional per capita income. 5 These income differences are explained by transition dynamics and region specific factors, e.g. the level of technology, the capital stock and skill levels of workers. The empirical cross-country and cross-regional studies on growth are mainly build on the neoclassical model extended to include government polices and the diffusion of technology among others. One important implication of neoclassical growth models is conditional convergence, which has been found in a large number of empirical studies (see Barro, 1999 ).
These models also predict that a reduction in trade barriers or an improvement of trade integration should increase income levels among all participating regions. As a corollary, after trade integration growth rates will be higher the lower are transfers, which reduce factor mobility and preserve differences in relative prices that are not attributable to differences in productivity or marginal costs (Boldrin and Canova, 2001 ).
In contrast, endogenous growth models that include the discovery of new ideas and methods of production are important to explain long-term growth (see, among others, Romer, 1987 , 1990 , Aghion and Howitt, 1992 , Grossman and Helpman, 1991 . Theories of basic technological change seem to be most important for understanding why we observe a continuous real growth in per capita output and why this growth could continue indefinitely.
In general terms, the determinants of GDP per capita growth in the neoclassical growth model can be described by the so-called convergence equation
y i0 denotes the initial income and x it describes region specific fundamental factors that determine the long run income. If the β coefficient is negative and regional fundamentals are not significant then unconditional convergence holds. Poor regions grow faster than rich regions and all regions converge to the same steady state income. If the β coefficient is negative and regional fundamentals do matter then conditional or β convergence holds. In this case, poorer regions grow faster once differences in their fundamentals are controlled for.
Obviously, conditional β convergence does not imply that regional differences in output disappear over time, as the regions might converge to different steady state outputs. To the extent the regions differ in their fundamentals such as the qualification of their labor force or their technology levels the neoclassical growth model does not predict absolute convergence of per capita output. It only implies that the per capita output converges to its long-run equilibrium, which itself may change over time.
Improvements in the fundamentals and therefore in the steady state level, y*, lead to temporary increases in economic growth. As the output y rises, the working of diminishing returns directs the growth rate, dy, to the value determined by the rate of technical progress.
As this transition period tends to be extended, the growth effects of a change in government policies or in private behavior can persist for a long time.
In our model of a small open economy the convergence equation can be specified as (see the appendix for the derivation)
y is the log of per capita output, y* its steady-state value, and the parameter λ governs the speed of adjustment. Note, that equation (7) is observationally equivalent with convergence equations derived for other neoclassical growth models (see e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995, Mankiw et al., 1992) . According to (8) the speed of convergence, λ, declines in particular with higher returns to scale of capital, α, and an increase in the adjustment costs φ.
Steady state income y* depends on the initial levels of the technology, A i0 , and the skill level, s i0 , as well as on the costs of adjusting the capital stock, φ. The level of technology can vary between regions because of differences in research and development, both private and state sponsored. The regional policy of the European Union can also affect the level of technology by providing subsidies for investment and complementary infrastructure. We assume that the constant Ai0 captures these persistent regional differences, Taken together, the EU regional policy can influence growth in this framework through two channels. First, it can aim to raise technology and skill levels in poor regions, thereby increasing the steady-state output per capita. A wider gap between current and potential output will lead to faster growth. Secondly, the EU regional policy can increase the speed of convergence by reducing adjustment costs. High adjustment costs, e.g. because of regulations, make capital accumulation less attractive, which leads to a slower investment process and a lower steady state income. This is especially damaging for low capital and therefore low income regions.
Data
It is not clear in the debate on regional convergence which level of (dis)aggregation is appropriate. The current Nomenclature des Unités Territoriales Statistiques subdivides the EU into 78 NUTS1 regions and 211 NUTS2 regions.
6 Table 1 reports some basic characteristics of the NUTS1 and NUTS2 regions. NUTS1 regions are on average almost three times as populous as NUTS2 regions. The spread between minimum and maximum regional GDP per capita is more pronounced on the more disaggregated NUTS2 level, while its variance is somewhat smaller.
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The European Union takes the NUTS2 regions as its point of reference. However, on this level of aggregation the data on a number of important indicators, e.g. school attainment and R&D expenditures, is still incomplete and marked by many data gaps. More data is available on the NUTS1 level. However, even on this level o f aggregation the choice of variables that could serve as indicators for technology and skill levels is extremely limited and restricted to the period of the 1990s. The data are taken from the EUROSTAT Newcronos Regio data base.
In the estimation of the convergence equation (12) 
Empirical results
The results of estimating equation (12) The regression shown in column (I) gives the result of a simple regression of the growth rate on the level of initial per capita GDP. The coefficient of the log of initial GDP can be interpreted as the rate of convergence. It is significant at the 1% level and the value of -.037 implies a speed of convergence of around 3.7%. As there are no variables controlling for differences in regional fundamentals, regression (I) measures the speed of unconditional convergence. Regression (II) includes also variables for the technology and for the skill levels. The proxy for technology has the expected positive sign and is significant on the 5%
level. The measure of educational attainment has a positive coefficient, it is not significant, however. The coefficient of the initial GDP per capita is highly significant and implies a conditional rate of convergence of 4.7 %. This corresponds to a halving of the difference in actual and steady state output every 15 years. This is about twice as fast as commonly found in convergence studies such as Mankiw et al. (1992) , Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), Neven and Gouyette (1995) , and Faderberg and Verspagen (1996) .
Regression (IV) includes all variables. The conditional speed of convergence, 4.8%, is again relatively high. Technology enters significantly and with a positive coefficient whereas the skill level is not significant. The coefficients on the Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund variables are not significant on conventional significance levels, indicating that the regional expenditures of theses funds do not lead to higher rates of real growth. It cannot be ruled out, that the regional policy variables also operate as (inverse) proxies for technology or human capital. Therefore, we add another regression (III) with only the regional policy proxies and the initial GDP per capita as regressors. Again, both policy variables are not significant on conventional significance levels, indicating that EU regional policy does not affect the regional growth pattern in the EU.
10 Table 2 : Real Growth (1992-99) and EU regional policy (NUTS 1)
Standard errors are in parenthesis below the coefficients. * significant at the 5% -level, ** significant at the 1% -level. Instruments include lagged value of GDP, the actual values of technology, skill level and policy variables, and the sectoral shares of agriculture and industry. The estimation weighs the regions equally.
Taken together the empirical analysis indicates that there is a distinct tendency for conditional convergence in the EU during the 1990s. Compared with other studies, we find that the speed of convergence on the NUTS1 level is about twice as high as commonly found in other 10 De la Fuente (2001)** reports empirical evidence that EU regional policy affects regional convergence within Spain. convergence studies. As has been pointed out, this β-convergence does not imply absolute or σ-convergence as the regions converge to their region specific steady state incomes which might be different and as they are als o subject to regional shocks. Thus, it comes at no surprise that the development of the regional income distribution in the EU as measured by e.g. the coefficient of variances does not show a strong tendency of absolute convergence.
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
However, on the basis of these empirical results we can rule out a tendency of income divergence. The empirical results also indicate that the EU regional policy does not seem to have a significant influence on growth performance of NUTS1 regions.
Obviously, these results are subject to a number caveats and indicate how little we know about the effects of regional policy. The analysis points out the many gaps in our knowledge, both theoretical and empirical, as well as the limitations of the data. There are a number of crucial problems. On the empirical side, we still lack the data to extensively estimate and test alternative growth theories and the role of regional policy on the NUTS1 and NUTS2 levels.
Therefore, the failure to find significant effects of regional policy for regional growth might also be due to the short estimation period 11 or deficient proxies for EU regional policy. Also there are no adequate concepts to decide on the appropriate level of regional disaggregation.
On the theoretical side convergence as well as divergence theories often neglect the role of public policies. 12 However, regional transfers and subsidies are an important issue in the EU.
In a more comprehensive study it might also be interesting to compare in a case study the experiences of Spain and Ireland to analyze the interaction between EU and domestic policies.
Conclusions
What do the empirical results imply for the EU regional policy. First, the EU motivates its regional policy by divergence theories. The policy builds on the "recognition that closer economic integration would not necessarily permit the reduction of regional disparities and could, initially at least, lead to them widening" (European Commission, 2001, p. VI) .
According to this view regional inequalities increase as poorer regions can fall behind richer regions in the growth process. His divergence can be caused by increasing returns to scale, externalities or a lack of the minimum level of infrastructure and human capital, that the 11 For a discussion of the length of the estimation period in the context of the convergence regression see de la Fuente, 1998, 12 See e.g. Martin (1999) for a discussion of regional policies on pubic infrastructure.
European Commission considers to be a prerequisite for the competitivity of European regions. However, the empirical results of this and other studies indicate that there is at least no tendency to greater regional inequality. Empirical evidence on the NUTS1 level does not point towards divergence, rather the opposite. Regional differences have a tendency to diminish, if we control for differences in regional steady state incomes, i.e. regional fundamentals.
Second, with convergence there also does not exist a conflict between the objective of maximizing aggregate growth in the union and the objective of greater regional equality and faster economic growth in the poorer regions -a view the European Commission holds ***Zitat***. If the Commission's view of regional income divergence were true, then the objective of maximizing aggregate output would imply to foster agglomeration and regional inequalities. This is not the case if convergence holds.
Third, regional differences are not likely to disappear fast. The empirical evidence indicates that it takes around 15 years for a region to reduce its income gap with the EU average by one half. While this speed of convergence is faster than commonly found in other studies, it is still rather slow by the political standards of e.g. the European Commission and the member states.
Also there will be no absolute convergence if regional differences in economic fundamentals persist and regions are subject to regional shocks Fourth, the possibilities of the European Commission to strengthen economic growth seem to be rather limited. The regional policy proxies in the regressions are not significant. Then again, the significant technology variable indicates that R&D might be a lever for the EU regional policy to improve the growth performance of regions. However, there is a deeper conflict in the workings of EU regional policy. It aims at improving the fundamentals of poor regions and increasing their potential long-run per capita output. At the same time, by providing these funds it decreases labor mobility. Yet. mo growth model predicts convergence in income levels without migration of labor and capital. The internal market program has improved the mobility of capital and to a lesser extent of labor. However, net labor flows in the EU are relatively small and of the poor European countries only Spain and Ireland have been net recipients of large inflows of foreign direct investment. It might be that the EU regional policy has contributed to this drop in labor mobility. As the programs provide funding for poor regions they keep workers in these regions and in agriculture as well as declining industries. Indeed, it is an explicit goal of the EU regional policy to stop migration out of low-income regions.
To improve regional convergence, the EU would have to rely more on institutional reforms that increase the mobility of labor and capital, such as the completion of the internal market program, and less on funding of projects, as it is the current practice. In this context the European Union's other policies should be reviewed with respect to the adjustment costs they create for investors. As discussed in the model, e.g. regulations can increase adjustment costs and thus hold back the catch-up process of poor regions by slowing down their speed of convergence and lowering their long run regional output.
The Eastern enlargement of the EU will increase the pressure on the EU regional policy. As relatively poor regions become EU members the demands on the regional policy will increase, while the funds will not (at least not at the same rate). This is a chance to improve on the efficiency of the European regional policy. The policy should be refocused on the poorest regions, and not as today on one half of the regions. It should also put more emphasis on measures that increase market integration. And it should take subsidiarity seriously.
Currently, the income differences within the large EU members France, Germany, Italy and the UK are similar to the income differences within the EU, i.e. regional income disparities are as much a intra-national as well as a supra-national phenomenon. Consequently, part of the regional policy should be implemented by the member states in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity. Taken together, Eastern enlargement should be seen as a chance to improve the working of EU regional policy. y is the log of per capita output, the parameter λ governs the speed of adjustment, and an asterisks * denotes a steady-state-variable. 13 The convergence parameter λ is determined by the structural parameters of the model The rate of convergence declines with a rise in the returns to scale of capital and an increase in the cost of adjustment φ.
